News BadRAM attack breaches AMD secure VMs using a Raspberry Pi Pico, DDR socket, and a 9V battery

Incredibly difficult attack to pull off; when physical security fails, ALL security fails. One of the Ten Immutable Laws of Security. Nevertheless, great that AMD has already released an update to fix this by validating memory modules. After all, expectations are high on confidential computing platforms, rightly-so.
 
so long as the patch doesn't cause performance issues, sure...

but this level of direct physical attack is ridiculous. ludicrous even.
Like, what's next? a patch against a raspi5, soldering iron, and paper clips?
 
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Incredibly difficult attack to pull off; when physical security fails, ALL security fails. One of the Ten Immutable Laws of Security. Nevertheless, great that AMD has already released an update to fix this by validating memory modules. After all, expectations are high on confidential computing platforms, rightly-so.

so long as the patch doesn't cause performance issues, sure...

but this level of direct physical attack is ridiculous. ludicrous even.
Like, what's next? a patch against a raspi5, soldering iron, and paper clips?

Once "Physical Security" has been compromised with your machine, all bets are off.
Agree with all of you, but the memory encryption is specifically aimed to prevent also this type of attack. So is absolutely due, that AMD and all the security related actors takes this type of vulnerabilities with maximum priority.
 
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State actors have been able to pull off physical security attacks by intercepting shipments and putting their own stuff in them. Or sometimes cooperated with the actual manufacturer.

Just because an attack is unlikely is by itself no reason not to have safeguards against it.
Proper risk analysis takes into account both the attack's likelihood and amount of damage it could cause.
 
State actors have been able to pull off physical security attacks by intercepting shipments and putting their own stuff in them. Or sometimes cooperated with the actual manufacturer.

Just because an attack is unlikely is by itself no reason not to have safeguards against it.
Proper risk analysis takes into account both the attack's likelihood and amount of damage it could cause.
Thats what i was thinking of, if you have access to the shipment or are the "supplier", you can ship whatever you want, then your target will take care of installing or using it themselves. Israel's recent beeper, burner phone, and walkie-talkie, lets call them "special operations" comes to mind. There is no reason a near peer couldn't do the same, only instead of commo equipment with a loud report, its compromised computer hardware.