I think to bypass the Bitlocker it appears that "ShrinkLocker" has modified several registry entries related to BitLocker and system security. These changes allowed it to
turn on BitLocker, even if the device lacks a Trusted Platform Module chip.
If I'm NOT mistaken, and after going through the original findings by the researchers, these attackers were able to deploy and run an advanced VBS script that took advantage of BitLocker for unauthorized file encryption.
The script added the following registry entries. If the script detects an error, it then restarts the system.
- fDenyTSConnections = 1: disables RDP connections;
- scforceoption = 1: enforces smart card authentication;
- UseAdvancedStartup = 1: requires the use of the BitLocker PIN for pre-boot authentication;
- EnableBDEWithNoTPM = 1: allows BitLocker without a compatible TPM chip;
- UseTPM = 2: allows the use of TPM if available;
- UseTPMPIN = 2: allows the use of a startup PIN with TPM if available;
- UseTPMKey = 2: allows the use of a startup key with TPM if available;
- UseTPMKeyPIN = 2: allows the use of a startup key and PIN with TPM if available;
- EnableNonTPM = 1: allows BitLocker without a compatible TPM chip, requires a password or startup key on a USB flash drive;
- UsePartialEncryptionKey = 2: requires the use of a startup key with TPM;
- UsePIN = 2: requires the use of a startup PIN with TPM.
The malware also seems to disable the
protectors used to secure BitLocker's encryption key and deletes them.
Having completed the deletion, it enables the use of a numerical password as a protector and the encryption feature.
It appears the hack successfully recovers the BitLocker keys, generates a random password, and then this information is sent back to the attacker(s).
As shown here, the code has actually
converted the previously generated encryption key to a secure string—a PowerShell option that prevents creating a string object in memory, and the effectively
enables BitLocker on the drives.
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