The keys to success here are: Linux, Truecrypt, then decoy Truecrypt volumes, all with hidden partitions with EXTREMELY long passwords, then random keyfiles laying everywhere that don't actually open anything(periodically doing something/anything to update the "modified" date in the file system). TSA goons aren't exactly cyberforensics experts(even the ones hired to be cyberforensics experts, obviously if they were good, they'd be corporate espionage or CIA folks). If you just have one truecrypt volume with no hidden volumes and short password, they could crack it if they used their acres of supercomputers under Langley AFB, but if they have to figure out which of 10 suspected Truecrypt volumes with 40+ character passwords and multiple hidden volumes is actually the right one, then it's going to be very difficult. You can also use some type of document as a keyfile, but only if it requires some kind of editing first, like a big text file contained in a separate volume where you must edit the beginning of the file by adding specific words, etc(maybe even random unicode characters from a character map)... Truecrypt will use the first 1024 bytes of the file as the passphrase, it's extremely difficult to bruteforce crack that no matter how much computational power you throw at it.