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Archived from groups: rec.games.diplomacy (More info?)
As a newbie to PBEM Diplomacy, I find it rather odd that so much
controversy surround such basic issues as whether a patently
impossible order (A Liv->Mos) is equivalent to an order to a hold when
it comes to that unit receiving support. I accept that there are (at
least) two sides to the argument, but surely the bottom line is that
the official rules are vague and poorly written.
I have two suggestions:
1) A committee of established Diplomacy experts should write a precise
legalistic statement of what constitutes a valid/legal/possible move,
etc.
2) Where possible, the legalistic rules should follow the principle of
military realism. That is, real fleets and armies are not robotic
entities that try to carry out any order that is synatcically valid.
They interpret the order and try to follow it if it makes sense.
The interpretation of 2) depends on what we imagine the fleet or army
to know. I usually imagine that the admiral of a fleet or the general
of an army has a copy of the board map and knows where he is, but not
where other units are or what their orders are. Thus, receiving the
order to move Liv-Mos, the general throws the order in the bin in
disgust and puts full effort into holding instead. Since he is trying
to hold, he can be supported in holding. By contrast, the general who
gets an order to move that would be possible with the appropriate
convoys will think it is a valid order. He may get his tanks and men
lined up on the beach, waiting for the ships to arrive, and only when
they fail to appear will he realise that he has wasted his efforts. He
is not actively defending his province, but trying to move, so he
cannot be supported in holding. (Some of you seem to think that the
general has knowledge of other unit positions, as well, which means
that he will wait on the beach if there is a fleet available, but not
if the sea is empty. That is fine, but if that is the favoured
interpretation it needs to be spelt out explicitly).
This does not solve the Stp coastal debate. A real admiral that got an
order that was only wrong in terms of the coast - and where the coast
suggested is not even reachable - would, in all likelihood, assume
that the coastal part of the message was an error, and ignore it,
carrying out the move to the suggested province (but I accept that
there are two sides to this argument).
Taken to an extreme, the principle of realism would mean that unwanted
support was not possible at all - and most of you would not want to
lose that quirk of the rules - but the principle could still be used
for cases that are genuinely unclear at present. At any rate, a clear
decision should be made on these issues so that we all know whether it
is possible to reject unwanted support by proposing a dodgy move.
As a newbie to PBEM Diplomacy, I find it rather odd that so much
controversy surround such basic issues as whether a patently
impossible order (A Liv->Mos) is equivalent to an order to a hold when
it comes to that unit receiving support. I accept that there are (at
least) two sides to the argument, but surely the bottom line is that
the official rules are vague and poorly written.
I have two suggestions:
1) A committee of established Diplomacy experts should write a precise
legalistic statement of what constitutes a valid/legal/possible move,
etc.
2) Where possible, the legalistic rules should follow the principle of
military realism. That is, real fleets and armies are not robotic
entities that try to carry out any order that is synatcically valid.
They interpret the order and try to follow it if it makes sense.
The interpretation of 2) depends on what we imagine the fleet or army
to know. I usually imagine that the admiral of a fleet or the general
of an army has a copy of the board map and knows where he is, but not
where other units are or what their orders are. Thus, receiving the
order to move Liv-Mos, the general throws the order in the bin in
disgust and puts full effort into holding instead. Since he is trying
to hold, he can be supported in holding. By contrast, the general who
gets an order to move that would be possible with the appropriate
convoys will think it is a valid order. He may get his tanks and men
lined up on the beach, waiting for the ships to arrive, and only when
they fail to appear will he realise that he has wasted his efforts. He
is not actively defending his province, but trying to move, so he
cannot be supported in holding. (Some of you seem to think that the
general has knowledge of other unit positions, as well, which means
that he will wait on the beach if there is a fleet available, but not
if the sea is empty. That is fine, but if that is the favoured
interpretation it needs to be spelt out explicitly).
This does not solve the Stp coastal debate. A real admiral that got an
order that was only wrong in terms of the coast - and where the coast
suggested is not even reachable - would, in all likelihood, assume
that the coastal part of the message was an error, and ignore it,
carrying out the move to the suggested province (but I accept that
there are two sides to this argument).
Taken to an extreme, the principle of realism would mean that unwanted
support was not possible at all - and most of you would not want to
lose that quirk of the rules - but the principle could still be used
for cases that are genuinely unclear at present. At any rate, a clear
decision should be made on these issues so that we all know whether it
is possible to reject unwanted support by proposing a dodgy move.