Archived from groups: comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical (
More info?)
While taking a short break from the daily grind of enslavement and
world domination, Giftzwerg mentioned
>In article <tuqd8114e0iri4vi4vn78bpreavb1ltohf@4ax.com>,
>not@thistime.net says...
>
>> >Yes, he had to be ordered to go to Australia. He actually refused to leave
>> >the Philippines until the President of the United States directly ordered
>> >him to leave. He was convinced folks would consider him a coward (as many
>> >do), otherwise he was staying with the boys. Got a bad rap for following
>> >those orders ever since..
>> >
>> >
>> One source of my (and many other Australians') disapproval of him is
>> the shameful way he treated and abused our troops. Not only the verbal
>> abuse of the heroes who had just stopped the invasion of Port Moresby
>> over the Kokoda Track, but the whole "mopping up" campaign of 1945
>> through Borneo and the Clebes, when as our General Staff protested,
>> the isolated Japanese forces could have been left to wither on the
>> vine, out of supplies. There's also the refusal to include Australian
>> troops in the Liberation of the Philippines, for his political
>> grandstanding.
>
>Well, this is an interesting mode of argument; when your "theory" that
>MacArthur had fled from Manila in a cowardly fashion was challenged -
>with the obvious fact that MacArthur had to be summarily *ordered* to
>leave - you come back with a new, wholly unrelated claim about
>MacArthur's "abuse" of Australian troops.
>
My previous message was facetious and I withdraw it completely. Your
points deserve more serious consideration.
My original complaint re: MacArthur was informed by my knowledge of
his later actions (including his career in Korea) and thus I cited a
commonly held opinion of him, here in Oz. I don't consider the two
aspects of his personality as evidenced by his actions to be unrelated
and taken together, they form the basis of my criticism.
The nickname "Dougout Doug" is applied because of his flight to
Melbourne, rather than basing his headquarters in either Sydney or
Brisbane.
Sydney was, of course, attacked by Japanese midget subs trying to sink
the USS Chicago and overflown on several occasions by IJN spotter
planes. It actually saw enemy action and was therefore inapproriate
for MacArthur to base himself, of course. It was the major East Coast
surface naval base, too and therefore likely to draw further attacks.
Brisbane certainly *would* have been appropriate since it became the
major base for US troops from 1943 onwards and it might have been a
good idea for the Commander, SWPA to have based himself near them, but
then, he was prepared to withdraw to "The Brisbane Line" in the event
of land invasion and surrender Northern Australia to the Japanese. We
now know that this wasn't really seriously considered by either the
IJA or IJN but WE didn't know that at the time.
Hobart might have been further away from the action, but there were no
good restaurants at that time. I'm told it's greatly improved since
then.
>Is it OK if we ask you for the text of the "verbal abuse" MacArthur
>served up to those heroes of New Guinea?
Your reference is Gavin Long's single volume condensation of his
multi-volume Official History, titled "the Six-Year War - Australia in
the 1939-45 War" ISBN 0 642 99375 0.
There are several references to MacArthur's attitude and comments in
Chapter 8 "The Tide Turns in the Pacific War", particularly:
- p224 Date 17th Sept 1942 - MacArthur's comments during a telephone
call to the Australian Prime Minister Mr Curtin.
- p232 Date 21st October - relayed through Gen Blamey, complaints
that tactical handling of troops was inadequate. ("Pig" Blamey was a
wonderful sycophant, formerly Commissioner of Police, Victoria - hence
the nickname, although he _was_ corpulent, too, and could be *relied*
upon to pass on alien criticism rather than defending his own troops.)
There are other passing references in that and subsequent chapters.
The actual text of the messages isn't included in Long's condensed
history (nor are the texts of any *other* official signals), and since
Blamey was criticised (justly) for his sycophancy, then I strongly
suspect that the originals have been disposed of.
You may have better luck Googling for them than I have. (Who was the
French general who refused to speak on the telephone because he didn't
want to be quoted in anybody else's memoirs?) The telephone message
to Curtin is likewise covered under the rules of Cabinet secrecy.
You may find more detailed coverage of MacArthur's relations with
Australian political and military leaders in the full Official
History, but I don't have that available to quote from.
> How about some details about
>how the Australian soldiers were (almost simultaneously) sent off to be
>uselessly slaughtered in the "mopping up" - and denied their proper
>moment of glory in liberating the Philippines?
The political considerations concerning the Philippines campaign
aren't well-documented, either. (Very few political or military
memoirs actually describe fully the motivations of their participants,
let alone their authors', and I have a strong suspicion that Freddy de
Guignand's hagiography of Montgomery is actively misleading, for
example) However, it was certainly a consideration that MacArthur
wanted the recapture of the colony to be completed solely by US
forces.
He, and Admiral King, (and possibly the US Government) didn't want
British or Commonwealth forces re-establishing their presence in the
old colonial areas, Burma or Malaya OR Hong Kong and successfully
defeated the idea of a land advance from India through those areas
into China, in favour of the "island-hopping" strategy through the
Marshalls and Marianas and the future B29 bases on Saipan.
Between them, they also limited the British return "East of Suez" to
the British Pacific Fleet and scuttled the proposed "Tiger Force" RAF
air component.
In August '44 MacArthur *was* prepared to include the two most veteran
A.I.F. Divisions (7th and 9th) by including them in US corps, but it's
been a firm Australian principle, since 1917 (ref. Pozieres,
Fromelles, Bullecourt, Gallipoli), that our troops would never be
commanded by foreigners again, and they would in this instance only be
available as 1 Aust Corps (with its own corps troops) and he wouldn't
accept that.
After a tentative plan for an Australian amphibious landing near
Aparri in northern Luzon (for 5th Dec 44) to secure airfields for
support for the assault on Manila , MacArthur decided that Nimitz
could guarantee enough carrier air support and cancelled the op.
Basically, after the US forces left New Guinea in Oct '44 and control
passed to 1st Aust. Army, the three component Australian divisions
were required to clean up the IJA 5th, 32nd and 48th Divs around the
Banda Sea, 35th and 36th in NW New Guinea, 20th, 41st and 51st around
Aitape-Wewak, 17th, 38th on New Britain, 6th on Bougainville and 14th
on Palau.
They relieved the US 32nd and Americal Divs (to Leyte), the 37th, 40th
and 43rd (to Luzon) and the 93rd (to Morotai).
US infantry divisions were three times the size of Australian divs, so
you can see that manpower was a consideration in the task required of
them. The doctrine of those US forces had been to set a perimeter
around their bases wide enough to preclude IJA attacks, then go on the
defensive.
The Australian forces were tasked with eliminating the IJA forces, not
with sealing them off and allowing them to starve.
>Or will you just move on to MacArthur's next vile depredation against
>humanity?
I'll say this in his favour, he was the right general to be the
American Shogun. His style suited that position in the Japanese
culture of sixty years ago.
I doubt he'd have been as good a President as Eisenhower proved to be,
but that's personal opinion and I have nothing with which to back it
up.
..
..
"When in danger or in doubt,
Run in circles, scream and shout"
..
It's not just a management tool,
It's a philosophy for living!!
..